khosq.com

As
tensions continue to simmer, Armenia's opposition leader Ter-Petrosian,
hopes to take advantage of the government's unpopularity.

By Richard Giragosian in Yerevan for ISN Security Watch (24/06/08)

Just two months since the inauguration of Armenia's third president,
simmering political tension continues to plague the new government of
President Serzh Sarkisian.

Although triggered by a disputed 19 February presidential contest,
the underlying causes of Armenia's post-election crisis include several
unresolved problems, ranging from widening socio-economic disparities
to a pronounced political polarization.

Unlike past political crises, however, Armenia's traditionally
fractured and marginalized opposition has been able to unite behind the
leadership of former president Levon Ter-Petrosian.

After spending a decade in political seclusion, Ter-Petrosian
emerged last year to pose a significant challenge to the country's
ruling elite, putting himself forward as a presidential candidate.

The return of the country's first post-Soviet president surprised
many observers and threatened to upset the long-planned transition from
outgoing President Robert Kocharian, constitutionally prevented from
seeking a third term, to his chosen successor, Prime Minister Serzh
Sarkisian.

Ironically, the Ter-Petrosian campaign represented a direct threat
to both Kocharian and Sarkisian, the very same leaders who forced him
to resign in 1998 amid an atmosphere of nationalist recriminations over
Ter-Petrosian's alleged willingness to adopt an unacceptably moderate
approach to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with neighboring
Azerbaijan.

Given the circumstances of his forced resignation, as well as the
authorities' concerted attempts to link much of the country's problems
to his administration, Ter-Petrosian faced an uphill battle throughout
the presidential campaign. His efforts were also hindered by the
overwhelming power of incumbency, which was exerted through the use of
"administrative resources" leveraging the influence of state resources
and offices.

As a result, Ter-Petrosian faced a pronounced disadvantage in both
articulating his platform and countering the authorities' assertions.
Yet the disparity between the rival Ter-Petrosian and Sarkisian
campaigns was most profound in terms of access to the media, with the
country's broadcast media dominated by an overly pro-government bias
and alternative opposition and independent media outlets under pressure
and threat.

In a private meeting with ISN Security Watch, Ter-Petrosian noted
the difficulties but asserted that "the timing of my return to politics
was not based on any personal ambition but was driven by the compelling
need to correct the dangerous and irresponsible policies of the
Kocharian regime," which he argued "put the country on the wrong path"
by only "fueling corruption and an abuse of power."

Armenia, he claimed, was increasingly becoming a "banditocracy"
where "a criminal class emerged to pillage and plunder the country's
strategic assets and whose leaders were leaving a legacy of moral and
political bankruptcy for the next generation of Armenians."

It was against this backdrop that the elections were won outright by Sarkisian, avoiding a second-round ballot.

Although the election results were disputed and marred by reports of
serious voting irregularities, the more significant implication from
the pre-election period was that the opposition was denied a fair
contest, leaving the ordinary voter with little choice and even less
voice. This also fueled a post-election crisis, with the opposition
resorting to mass rallies and public demonstrations in the streets,
reflecting a sense that public demands and personal rights were
blatantly ignored or denied by the authorities.

It was at this point that Ter-Petrosian was able to reach far beyond
the core group of his supporters and opposition activists, bridging the
normally apathetic and politically uncommitted citizenry. For the first
time, he has managed to forge a broad-based consensus bolstered by his
pledge to spur true political change and not simply a personal return
to power - a claim for which the jury is still out.

Ter-Petrosian reiterated his willingness "to serve less than a full
[five-year] term as president," offering instead to "hold the office
[of president] for two or three years, as a period of sufficient time
to allow for the implementation of broad, lasting and meaningful
reforms, as well as a sincere effort to combat corruption in the
country."

As tension mounted, opposition demonstrators staged increasingly
serious mass protests, overnight vigils and even hunger strikes.

In turn, the authorities, acting on the orders of Kocharian in his
last days in office, over-reacted to the crisis, culminating in an open
and violent clash between opposition demonstrators and riot police on 1
March that left at least 10 dead, many injured and even more arrested.

The confrontation prompted the authorities to introduce a one-month
state of emergency, complete with sweeping restrictions on the media
and on the freedoms of assembly and speech. Yet the state of the
emergency only deferred, rather than defeated the confrontation between
the state and the opposition. By resorting to the imposition of virtual
martial law under the terms of a state of emergency as an immediate
reaction to the crisis, the authorities only fanned the flames of
political discord and discontent.

Interestingly, it also demonstrated an inverse relationship between
regime security and state stability, whereby each step to secure the
regime posed an equal and corresponding move toward destabilizing the
state.

In Ter-Petrosian's opinion, the state of the emergency merely
confirmed the "desperation and fear of an illegitimate regime" and
tended to reveal that the Armenian authorities were concerned solely
with "maintaining power in order to reproduce the regime in another
form."

Yet in the weeks after the end of the state of emergency and a
seemingly peaceful return to normalcy, the continued tension suggested
that the crisis was far from resolved and that the country was even
farther from reconciliation.

Most recently, the opposition staged a mass rally on 20 June, with
between 10-15,000 supporters demonstrating against the Armenian
government and demanding sweeping political change.

This demonstration was a key test for the opposition and its success
ensured that the momentum for political change could be sustained
through the hot summer months, a period known for relative political
inactivity.

The 20 June rally was also an important opportunity for
Ter-Petrosian to maintain pressure on the authorities, a necessity if
the opposition movement was to uphold the momentum of its political
strategy.

In his public address to the demonstrators, Ter-Petrosian stressed
two priorities. First, to demonstrate the "firm resolve of the people
to the government and the international community" that despite the
election results, the "free and conscious people of Armenia reject" and
view the government as "illegitimate." Second, the release of all
opposition supporters ("political prisoners" in Ter-Petrosian's words)
from police detention, followed by dialogue with the government.

Ter-Petrosian also reiterated his demand for "early presidential and parliamentary elections" as a "solution" to the crisis.

Although the adherence to such a maximalist position may seem
unrealistic, as an initial bargaining chip it may actually be a prudent
position prior to entering into a political dialogue with the
authorities.

The issue of dialogue is also significant as a means of addressing
the polarization of politics in Armenia, especially as even prior to
Armenia's recent post-election crisis, this political polarization had
been defined largely by a division based on affiliations to a narrow
set of political leaders and parties. For the past decade, for example,
such political polarization was manifested by a division between
supporters of the ruling elite and a largely fractured and fragmented
opposition.

In terms of national politics, neither camp demonstrated much more
than a desire to simply attain or maintain power, offering little in
terms of strategic vision or policy alternatives.

At the same time, there has been an equally profound economic
divide, driven by widening inequalities in wealth and income. But most
importantly, it is the combination of this political polarization and
economic division that has now resulted in deep fissures within
Armenian society as a whole.

Yet even in the face of these political challenges and a crisis of
confidence, the more serious threat to stability stems not from
political polarization, but from mounting economic pressure.

More specifically, with the new Armenian government weakened by
internal discord and a lack of legitimacy, the onset of a new economic
crisis represents one of the most significant threats to security and
stability in Armenia.

As for Ter-Petrosian, he believes that this time things could be
different and he is taking every advantage of the fact that, as he sees
it, "the Armenian people are clearly different this time, with little
fear and even less patience for the political status quo," and the new
government is also different, beset by a "profound unpopularity and an
absence of trust."

But it will be from within the broader economic context that the new Armenian government will face its next serious challenge.

Thus, it seems that even beyond the context of the current political
crisis, the new Armenian government faces an even more challenging
economic crisis against a backdrop of simmering tension and impatience.

But even as Ter-Petrosian has admitted, the "course of reform and
change needed to correct the path toward a law-based society is
difficult and far from certain in Armenia."