The following is the translation of an article authored by the President of Armenia and published in the Saturday, November 1, 1997 issue of Hayastani Hanrapetutiun daily.
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WAR OR PEACE?
TIME FOR THOUGHTFULNESS

by LEVON TER-PETROSSIAN

My September 26 press conference, more correctly that portion of the press conference that was devoted to Karabagh, became the occasion for the inflammation of intense passions in the press and at gatherings organized by the opposition. This did not surprise me; to some extent I had expected an even more vehement reaction.
The surprise was the quality of the debate, in fact, the absence of any debate. I must confess that I failed to achieve my objective, which was to stimulate, in the press and at public gatherings, a serious debate on the thorniest problem facing the Armenian people, namely, the possible paths to resolve the Nagorno Karabagh conflict.
The opposition's response did not transcend the bounds of profanities, imputations, labeling, and distortions. No rational proposal was made, no alternative plan was offered, no well-grounded counterargument was introduced. One can reach two conclusions: the opposition does not have a plan for the resolution of the Karabagh conflict or, if it has one, it is hiding it and is far from being engaged in a task beneficial to the nation. I will refrain from harsher characterizations.
What did the people understand from the uproar made by the opposition? People understood that we have shed blood for Artsakh, that returning the occupied territories will endanger the existence of Artsakh, that the Armenian people is ready once again to shed blood for Artsakh, that we don't give a damn about world public opinion, that we will bring both Azerbaijan and the international community to their knees, that the whole nation will turn into fedayees.
Then what? No one tried to give answers to the following simple questions:
Will doing all of that bring about our desired goal?
What will the world's reaction be if we tell the world we don't give a damn about it?
Will it be the blood of the 500 who gathered at the Cinema House or the blood of our innocent people that will be shed?
At least the last question has an unequivocal answer. Not a single hair will be lost from any one of the 500 who gathered at the Cinema House, notwithstanding their declarations of readiness for everything to the contrary. When Artsakh was in danger, when the enemy had just about reached Gantzasar, not one of the 500 responded to Vazgen Sargsian's appeal and none joined the brigade of the death-row inmates. Our people must by now have had enough of those who seek glory and behave as heroes at the cost of the lives of others.
Besides partisan considerations, the confusion within the ranks of the opposition may also be explained by their ignorance. That is natural, since there are only six individuals in all of Karabagh and Armenia who have a command of the process of the resolution of the conflict: Arkadi Ghukasian, Robert Kotcharian, Alexander Arzumanian, Vardan Oskanian, Jirair Libaridian, and I.

The Object of the Debate

At any rate, no debate ensued. This should disappoint neither me nor our public. Any political leader or intellectual aspiring to determine the fate of the nation will be compelled, sooner or later, to set aside the swearing (I am not talking about the psychologically ill) and to confront the people with a concrete and reasoned plan.
Without waiting for that to happen, I am ready today to discuss seriously any reasonable plan for the resolution of the Karabagh conflict and I agree to participate in a public debate at any level.
But a debate will be objective only when it accepts as starting points the answers which the participants must provide to a few key questions:
- Should the question of Karabagh be resolved through war or through negotiations?
- Is it possible to maintain the status quo and the unresolved state of the Karabagh question for ever or even for an extended period of time?
- What is in the interest of Karabagh and Armenia: the resolution or the non-resolution of the conflict?
- Will the question be resolved through compromise or with the defeat of one side? And which of the parties will be the defeated one?
I have often expressed my position clearly on these questions and still maintain that:
- War must be precluded; the question of Karabagh, therefore, must be resolved exclusively through peaceful negotiations.
- It is not possible to maintain the status quo for a long period of time because neither the international community nor Armenia's economic capabilities will permit it.
- The unresolved state of the question is not in the interest of Karabagh or of Armenia, because that is palpably hindering the economic development of Armenia--and, therefore, of Karabagh; it is causing complications in our relations with the international community and, especially, with neighboring countries that can have fatal consequences.
To solve the question of Karabagh we have only one option, a compromise solution, which does not mean that one side is the victor and the other the loser; it does mean finding an agreement based on what is possible when the conflict has reached maturity.
The opposition should not mislead the people by arguing that there is an alternative to the compromise: the alternative to compromise is war.
The rejection of compromise and maximalism (the drive to obtain the maximum rather than the possible) is the shortest path to the final destruction of Karabagh and the worsening of the situation in Armenia.
This is not a debate on losing or not losing Karabagh. Rather, it is on keeping Karabagh Armenian. Karabagh has been inhabited by Armenians for 3,000 years and so it must be for another 3,000 years.
The path I have chosen will secure that prospect and the means to preserve it, to reach our desired goal. The path of the adventurers will lead to certain defeat. Already once, “having turned Istanbul into a sea of blood”, we lost Western Armenia; and on another occasion, we lost half of Eastern Armenia while demanding the territories designated by the Treaty of Sevres.
Besides the essence of the compromise, its timing is also important. It is obvious that in the case of a compromise, the stronger party has the chance of obtaining the maximum possible. Today Armenia and Karabagh are stronger than ever. But in the event of the non-resolution of the conflict, within a year or two they will be substantially weakened. That which we are rejecting today, we will be asking for tomorrow, but we will not get it, as has often happened in our history.
We must be realistic and understand that the international community will not for long tolerate the situation created around Nagorno Karabagh because that is threatening regional cooperation and security as well as the West's oil interests. Sooner or later the parties will be presenting a compromise plan for the resolution of the conflict. This plan will provide for a political, not legal, solution, although the big powers will be offering it as a model articulation of international law. Neither Azerbaijan nor Karabagh and Armenia will be able to reject the compromise, just as was the case with the parties in the Bosnian and Arab-Israeli conflicts.
A mutually acceptable compromise should not be seen, however, solely as an imposition. On the contrary, the conflicting parties themselves must exert gigantic efforts to achieve it, because the alternative, as stated, is war and new sufferings for the peoples involved.
Compromise is not a choice between the good and the bad, but rather between the bad and the worse; that is, compromise is just a means to avoid the worst, from which the parties benefit when they have become conscious of the worst and are able to display the necessary political will and courage.
In reaching out for a compromise, parties usually are guided by a few considerations: to free themselves of a conflict that hinders their normal functioning and development and is full of dangers; to postpone it to gain time, to gather their forces and resolve it at a time more propitious for them; and to avoid unpredictable complications, hoping that in the future the thinking of peoples may undergo changes and values may be reassessed, as a result of which the issue will lose its acute character and borders, for example, will lose the significance they have today. Such thinking and reassessment of values are dominant now in Europe; tomorrow they could also become dominant in the Near East. The Arab-Israeli peace process may be a testimony to that.
Compromise will satisfy every party to the conflict to some extent, but at the same time it will fully satisfy none of them. President Aliyev will present that compromise as the victory of Azerbaijan, while I will try to present it as Armenia's. The Azerbaijani opposition will charge that Aliyev has committed an act of treason and sold Karabagh. The opposition in Armenia will consider that I have acted treacherously and sold Karabagh.
In such circumstances one could not exclude the possibility of the Rabin-Peres syndrome. One should also not ignore the Natanyahu syndrome: having come to power with uncompromising positions, within a short time, albeit unwillingly, he was compelled to continue the peace process started by Rabin and Peres.

Some Misconceptions

As part of the propaganda campaign undertaken in the aftermath of my press conference, the opposition has put in circulation a number of misconceptions, some of which I consider necessary to address briefly.
The first misconception, a dangerously misleading premise if you wish, is that the antagonist of Karabagh in this conflict is Azerbaijan, which can easily be brought to its knees. In reality, however, the antagonist is the international community to which, in fact, we are throwing the gauntlet. Not to understand this simple fact means subjecting our people to calamitous trials and tribulations.
The second misconception is the baseless insistence that Karabagh has won the war and, therefore, has no need to accept a compromise. Unfortunately, Karabagh has won the battle, not the war.
A war is considered won only when the foe has been forced into capitulation. The confusion between battle and war has brought misfortune to many.
The third misconception is that since we have succeeded in everything so far, success awaits us in the future as well. That is, so far we have defeated Azerbaijan, we are certain to do so in the future; we have been able to resist external pressures in the past, we can continue to do so in the future, etc. This may be the most dangerous of the misconceptions because it views the successes of the past rather than the relation of forces in the future as the guarantee for future success. Those who think in this manner have a serious problem with the elementary laws of logic. Had future victories been predicated upon past successes, then once a victor, a party would always remain a victor. The Roman Empire, for example, should never have been destroyed.
The next misconception, more accurately inanity, is the assertion that the President of Armenia is selling Karabagh to keep himself in power. It is difficult to believe that even a mentally deficient person could concoct the argument that any one in Armenia could maintain power by selling Karabagh.
Incidentally, a word must be said regarding this appetite for power. What would have compelled me to cling to power at any cost: the benefits, the glory, or the need to become a hero?

During my presidency I have received neither any advantages nor wealth (you can check on that) and do not wish to receive any.
Had I been motivated by the need to achieve glory or to become a hero, I simply would have stayed out of the 1996 elections, and thus remaining in the eyes of future generations as a President who brought independence, won the heroic war in Karabagh, and expanded Armenian territories, regardless of the degree to which ascribing these to me may be justified. Why should I have been concerned about what would have happened or who would bear responsibility for the worsening of the situation in the aftermath. It is all the same, my rating would not have suffered as a result; even, on the contrary, under such circumstances my rating might have gone up. I repeat, from a personal point of view that might have been the best solution, but that would have also constituted nothing less than cowardly desertion of which, fortunately or unfortunately, I do not have the habit. I have been reelected with the cool consciousness of the difficulties facing me and the responsibility I carry in the task of overcoming them; and I have no regrets.
Is it possible that I do not know the cheap methods of projecting myself as a hero and as the embodiment of all national aspirations, and to please the public at any cost? Couldn't I have cursed the Turks night and day, raised the issue of the recognition of the Genocide at the UN, revoked the Treaty of Kars, demanded from Turkey the territories designated by the Treaty of Sevres, presented an ultimatum to Azerbaijan, recognized the independence of Karabagh, declared that we will cede none of the territories, etc.?
I could have used all these ploys cleverly, at any rate no less cleverly than any one of those gathered at the Cinema House. Was it my education that was inadequate or my brains that could not cut it? I could have easily earned the reputation of the brave and great patriot, become the idol of the nation, and the symbol of unity of Armenia and the Diaspora.
What, then, is stopping me from doing all of that? Is it my lack of courage, my cosmopolitan thinking, my essence that is indifferent to a national ideology, or my faulty education? The only obstacle is the political calculation and the concern to keep our people safe from misfortunes. In case of any different behavior, catastrophes and calamities would have been unavoidable and we not only would have lost Karabagh but also endangered the existence of Armenia. We need not go far for illustrations. Let us remember the fortunes of our neighbors. We were eyewitness to the behavior of Gamsakhurdia and Elchibey who opted for the politics of heroics, became national idols, but brought innumerable calamities to their nations.

Myths and Riddles

There are also persistent assertions in the arena of Armenia's political thinking and public opinion which belong to the field of myths and riddles.
First Myth. Armenia is exerting pressure on the authorities of Nagorno Karabagh.
Regarding this assertion, I can state with full responsibility that only once Armenia has exerted pressure on Nagorno Karabagh. That was in 1993, to convince it to participate in the negotiations of the Minsk group; that participation has fully justified itself.
Armenia has no intention to exert pressure on Nagorno Karabagh either today or tomorrow. It is the authorities of Karabagh that make decisions in the name of Karabagh, naturally bearing responsibility for their decisions not only before the population of Karabagh but also the entire Armenian people. This does not mean that Armenia will not consult with the authorities of Karabagh and try to persuade them regarding issues it considers appropriate. But the final decision remains with the Karabagh authorities.
Second Myth. Should Armenia adopt a tough position vis a vis Turkey and confront it with the issues of the recognition of the Genocide, of the revocation of the Treaty of Kars, and of territorial demands, then Turkey and Azerbaijan will make more concessions on the question of Karabagh.
It is my deep conviction, which I can demonstrate through concrete political analysis, that such a position would not bring any advantages to the solution of the Karabagh problem, it would also result in new complications in the relations between Turkey and Armenia that would further aggravate the situation of Armenia and Karabagh.
It should be obvious to the naked eye that, quite to the contrary, such a position would provide additional bases for Azerbaijan and Turkey to charge that Armenia is an expansionist state and to set against Armenia an already unfavorable international public opinion.
Third Myth. Had Armenia utilized the Diaspora's lobbying capabilities correctly, then Diaspora communities would not have permitted their governments to trample upon the rights of Nagorno Karabagh.
Before commenting on this myth, it is necessary to point out that of all the Diaspora communities, it is only the Armenian-American one that has lobbying capabilities; other countries do not have lobbying traditions and, therefore, there are no organized lobbying groups elsewhere.
I do not underestimate, of course, the lobbying work of the Armenian-American community to produce serious humanitarian assistance to Armenia and shape an opinion favorable to Nagorno Karabagh in the US Congress. One should not forget, at the same time, that lobbying has its limits: its influence ends where US national interests begin. That is the case not only for the Armenian but also for all other lobbying organizations. This includes the Jewish lobby which, while being considered the strongest, is not omnipotent.
Fourth Myth. The current cosmopolitan minded authorities of Russia do not understand the strategic interests of their country (in this matter Armenia shares the guilt, since it has failed to explain this fact to them). But soon the genuinely nationalistic forces will come to power in Russia and, turning Armenia into the Israel of the Caucasus, will resolve the Karabagh question to our advantage.
Every one of the assumptions underlying this myth is suspect and questionable, not to say inane.
- Are the current Russian authorities really cosmopolitan minded?
- Do they really not understand the strategic interests of their country?
- Is it Armenia that must explain these interests to them?
- Aren't those giving lessons to Russia placing themselves in a laughable situation?
- Will nationalist forces, in fact, come to power in Russia?
- Have these forces promised to make a present of Karabagh to Armenia or recognize its independence? Has such a promise been made orally or in writing?
- And, finally, how long will the madness of becoming the toy of Russia or any other country through self-deception remain the lifestyle of the Armenian?
Does it require great intelligence to understand that, whatever the forces governing it, Russia could never recognize the independence of Karabagh, because it has twenty of its own Karabaghs?
Fifth Myth. Working very actively in international fora and media, Azerbaijan has actually won the propaganda war (which is often confused with diplomatic victory).
This may be the only myth that is not totally baseless. Compared to Armenia and Karabagh, Azerbaijan has in fact made much noise in international fora and the media. The reason, however, is quite simple, and it is natural. What else was left to

do for Azerbaijan? It had lost the military confrontation, lost any control over Karabagh, been deprived of territories, and fallen under the pressure of some five hundred thousand refugees. What answer were the President and Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan to give to their people other than pretend they were bravely struggling for the conquest of their territories by raising a lot of noise?
Even if it were true that we have lost the propaganda war, then we must determine what was more preferable: to preserve Karabagh and lose the propaganda war or lose Karabagh and win a brilliant victory in the propaganda arena? We have won so many propaganda and moral victories in history that perhaps that sort of victory is more to our taste. This does not mean, of course, that we should ignore propaganda activity and not undertake measures to neutralize the impact of Azerbaijani propaganda.
Let us stop here with the listing of myths and move on briefly to a few of the riddles, leaving their solution to those with exceptional ingenuity.
First Riddle. It is possible to achieve the goal of independence for Karabagh and at the same time avoid war (from Vazgen Manoukian's campaign platform).
What do we have here? A lightning in the mind of a genius, incomprehensible to the common mortal, or a temporary dimming of the brain that can happen to anyone? Perhaps President Aliyev has whispered something in the ear of its author that remains unknown to us. At any rate, this is a riddle presented to the Armenian political mind that even Einstein could not decipher.
Second Riddle. It is possible to ignore the international community yet continue receiving assistance from it.
Due to my position, I am the most in contact with leaders of the international community. I have never received such assurances from them. On the contrary, with each step we see the subtly covered conditioning of assistance by political considerations. Perhaps here, too, we are guilty of being unable to explain to the international community its strategic interests. It is true that we are neglecting our mission as a universal nation, i.e., of giving lessons to the whole world.
Third Riddle. We, the opposition, have no plan for the resolution of the Karabagh conflict. But since the current leadership, lacking a national ideology, is incapable of resolving that question, then give us the power and we will resolve it, while incidentally also restoring Armenia's industry, increasing wages five to ten fold, and inundating the country with foreign investments.

I do not even know whether I should comment on this riddle. But I cannot but point out that in politics sincere statements do not constitute an argument and the people have never turned power over to anyone trusting in his sincere word, especially when that word, in addition to containing a riddle, comes closer to a genre of mythology replete with miracles.

A Package or Step by Step Solution?

The opposition press is exerting every effort to convince the public that Nagorno Karabagh supports the package solution while Armenia favors the step by step solution, the latter being full of dangers. I might not have raised this issue if, to my surprise, representatives of Karabagh had not made statements along the same line.
Those who followed closely my September 26 press conference will have noted that I characterized both--the package and the step by step solutions--as "realistic options." I also pointed out that Armenia accepted, with serious reservations, the first plan proposed by the Minsk group co-chairmen, which was nothing less than a package solution to the question. It was only after both Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabagh rejected that option categorically and in writing that the co-chairmen were compelled to propose a step by step solution.
In that press conference I stated: "What, in fact, did happen? The mediators and all of us became convinced that both Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabagh were not prepared to discuss the issue of the status of Nagorno Karabagh, because each of the two has its own conception of that status that is in sharp conflict with that of the antagonist. All concerned were convinced of this. I believe that the choice then went to the only realistic approach. If such an option [a package solution] is not accepted, meaning it cannot be realized, then we must today try to realize the 'step by step' alternative." (Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, 27 September, 1997.)
By first rejecting the package, then the step by step solutions, and today proposing to return to the package approach, the Karabagh side has put both Karabagh and Armenia in an uncomfortable situation. Nonetheless, I do not think that we are facing tragedy or a deadlock, since it is possible to combine these two approaches easily.

The main thing today is the resumption of negotiations that have been interrupted for a year. This requires that finally the parties to the conflict sometime soon accept a draft document that would constitute the basis for the negotiations. If that does not occur before the next Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE to be held in Copenhagen in December, then we can expect serious complications.

Conspiracy is Ruled Out

There is also an attempt by the opposition to create the impression that the co-chairmen are organizing a conspiracy against Karabagh, to which Levon Ter-Petrossian is participating because of his inaptitude or his treacherous intentions. The secrecy of negotiations is specially capitalized to create this impression, although I believe I have discussed that aspect exhaustively in my address to the 9th ANM Congress. I am compelled to quote the relevant passage:
“Secrecy does not necessarily mean treachery. This is simply international diplomatic practice that facilitates the process of negotiations, keeping it at a distance from unnecessary noise and propagandistic exploitations. Suffice it to remind ourselves that the current Arab-Israeli negotiations were preceded by years of secret negotiations.
It is clear that secrecy applies only to the negotiating phase. But once agreements have been achieved and before the signing of final treaties, the plan for the resolution will naturally be presented to the judgement of our people as well as of the peoples of Artsakh and Azerbaijan.
I can assure you of one thing. Armenia will never sign any document which does not also carry the signature of Nagorno Karabagh.” (Hayastani Hanrapetutiun, July 15, 1997.)
It would seem that everything that needed to be said is said for any thinking person, for any one with elementary mental capabilities. But those who are habitual tricksters and suffer from a feverish need to mislead the public do not feel compelled to appear logical and, generally speaking, have little to do with reason, since it is possible for them to get achieve their goal by distorting the opponent's words and hiding their own nakedness behind imagined ascriptions, relying on the worst human instincts.
Conspiracy is ruled out essentially not due to subjective reasons, i.e., not because either Ter-Petrossian or someone else wishes to think or pictures the situation to be so, but strictly from a legal point of view. That is, there will in effect be a clear legal mechanism for the review of the resolution of the Karabagh conflict that will involve the following consecutive phases:
A. As noted above, once agreements are reached but before the signing of final treaties, the plan will be presented to the judgement of the interested peoples;
B. Any conflict resolution plan or treaty requires the signature of Nagorno Karabagh;
C. Following the signature, any plan or treaty must be ratified by the respective parliaments of the conflicting parties.
As we can see, both the people and the opposition will have the opportunity to review the resolution process and to impact its outcome. I would be only too gratified if during public discussions and parliamentary debate the opposition came forth with alternative proposals, which would give us the possibility of reaching the right decision, because on the question of Karabagh we have no right to make mistakes.
Let us not be preoccupied with self-deception and let us not cherish hollow illusions. On the issue of Karabagh's independence we have no allies. No one will resolve the present enigma but us. We are the ones who must resolve it, and we will resolve it to the extent that our capabilities allow us. Our only ally is our rejection of adventurism.
It is not my intention to present a tragic picture or to sound the alarm because I am confident of the circumspection of our people.